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INTRODUCTION
In The School of Giorgione, Walter Pater proclaimed that "[all art
constantly aspires toward the condition of music."' He continued:
For while in all other kinds of art it is possible to distinguish the
matter from the form, and the understanding can always make this
distinction, yet it is the constant effort of art to obliterate it. That
the mere matter of a poem for instance, its subject, namely its given
incidents of situation-that the mere matter of a picture, the actual
circumstances of an event, the actual topography of a land-
scape-should be nothing without the form, the spirit, of the
handling, that this form, this mode of handling, should become an
end in itself, should penetrate every part of the matter: this is what
all art constantly strives after, and achieves in different degrees.2
Music, as the "ideally consummate art,"' fuses matter and form. It
does not invite the excision of import from its expression. Each
composition, moreover, is not particularly amenable to the
dichotomization of theory and practice. What I submit is that an in-
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1. Walter Pater, The School of Giorgione, in THE RENAISSANCE 153, 156 (William E. Buckler
ed., 1986) (explaining that although poetry, music, and painting are each collected under
general category of "art," each form addresses different senses and is peculiar to its own form,
like music).
2. Id
3. IL (stating that all art forms must be measured against music because only music
achieves perfect merger of form and matter).
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house appellate clinic4 is to legal education as what Pater suggests
music is to art.
Most law teachers and commentators would acquiesce in the
proposition that both theory and practice are components of legal
education. They would, however, define theory and practice
differently and express diverse views on how and to what degree
academia can and should accommodate both.' One problem with
4. Robert Dinerstein, Report of the Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic, 42J. LEGAL
EDUC. 508, 511 (1992) [hereinafter Report of the Committee (discussing findings of Subcommittee
on Pedagogical Goals of In-House, Live-Client Clinics). The Subcommittee defines "in-house,
live-client clinical education" as:
The in-house clinic firther supplements the definition of clinical education by adding
the requirement that the supervision and review of the student's actual case (or
matter) experience be undertaken by clinical teachers rather than by practitioners
outside the law school. Although the clinical movement began with practitioners used
as supervisors, many clinical teachers came to believe that student supervision by
practitioners was problematic for a methodology in which teaching was not incidental
to the enterprise, but rather its primary function. While a practitioner might be a
superb lawyer, she would be unlikely to have the training, experience, or time to
devote to the teaching role that a full-time clinical teacher would.
Id For a fine defense of "practice supervised clinical programs," conducted by practitioners
outside of the law school, or "externships," see generally Stephen T. Maher, The Praise of Folly:
A Defense of Practice Supervision in Clinical Legal Education, 69 NEB. L. REv. 537, 542 (1990)
(arguing that such practice supervised clinical programs benefit students by providing cost-
effective ways to bridge gap between law school and law practice, clarify career choices, and
introduce professional responsibility to law students).
5. For a discussion of the appropriate roles of these two components in legal education,
see Brook K. Baker, Beyond MacCrate: The Role of Context Experience, Theory, and Reflection in
EcologicalLearning, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 287,292 (1994) (recommending shift to practical-based legal
education system); Frank S. Bloch, The Andragogical Basis of Clinical Legal Education, 85 VAND. L.
REV. 321, 325 (1982) (discussing ways to introduce novel areas of legal theory into law school
curriculum through clinics); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L REv. 34.34 (1992) (deriding socially purposeless scholarship
among legal academics while urging law schools to teach ethics, produce "practical" scholarship,
and train students to practice law); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism
and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L REv. 1599, 1601 (1991) [hereinafter Goldfarb, A Theory-
Practice Spiral] (examining relationship between theory and practice in legal academia from
clinical education and feministjurisprudential perspective); Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers:
Developing A Clinical Perspective on Critical Legal Theory, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 718-19 (1992)
[hereinafter Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers] (suggesting that clinical legal education can generate
climate favorable to social change and comparing clinical legal theory to critical race theory);
A.J. Goldsmith, An Unruly Conjunction? Social Thought and LegalAction in Clinical Legal Education,
43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 415, 417 (1993) (examining relationship between social theory and legal
practice in clinic setting and acknowledging social characteristics of legal practice); M.H.
Hoeflich, Plus Ca Change, Plus C'est La Mime Chose: The Integration of Theory and Practice in Legal
Education, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 123, 124-41 (1993) (detailing historical models of legal education
from American Revolution to present); Howard Lesnick, Being a Teacher of Lawyers: Discerning
the Theory of My Practice, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 1095,1097 (1992) (discussing teacher's role in assisting
practitioner to realize self through work); Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education:
An Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L. REV. 577, 603 (1987) (challenging label of clinical
education as "skills training" and traditional case method as "theory" and suggesting that theory
label could apply to clinical education).
6. Compare Baker, supra note 5, at 292 (arguing that "we overturn the hegemony of
educator-centric views about legal education and that we undertake a radical shift, a
paradigmatic shift, in our understanding of the role to be played by practice-based experiences
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trying to attach meanings to concepts like theory and practice and
with analyzing their respective roles in legal education is that such
tasks tend to engender a perspective-even if it is only fleeting-on
theory and practice as antipodal. By way of example, Professor Mark
Spiegel, who provides some of the most workable definitions of theory
and practice, inevitably portrays them as opposites.7 In describing
theory as "a set of general propositions used as an explanation" and
practice as "the doing of something,"' Professor Spiegel implicitly
resurrects the perceived apartheid of thought and action.
This Essay's broad thesis is that legal education should strive toward
not only an obliteration of the seeming partition between theory and
practice, but also a complete coalescence of thought and action. In-
house clinics are sui generis because they can best effectuate such
objectives.'
Lamentably, many legal educators still equate clinics with the purely
"practical" or relegate them to the genre of courses designed to
cultivate the skills for "the doing" of the practice of law.'0 Even
some advocates of clinical education unknowingly undermine their
during law school") with Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 415 (welcoming clinics, but arguing that
they should "include a theoretical component, directed to encouraging law students to critically
examine, understand, and evaluate the activities comprising legal practice").
7. See Spiegel, supra note 5, at 577 (referring to clinical education as skills training and
case method as theoretical or otherwise characterized as "the main tent and the sideshow").
8. Spiegel, supra note 5, at 580.
9. It, however, took clinical legal education some time to evolve into the sphere that can
potentially fuse theory and practice. In the 1960s, many clinical programs began with the
primary goal of providing legal representation to individuals who were traditionally
underrepresented. SeeROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION iN AMERICA FROM THE
1850s TO THE 1980s, at 215-16 (1983) (analogizing first clinical programs to legal aid); Edgar
S. Cahn &Jean C. Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?-The Public Interest in Public Interest
Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005, 1029 (1970) (suggesting that law schools use clinics to meet growing
need for public interest practitioners). While clinics can indeed accomplish this salutary goal,
they are much more than academic legal aid offices. See Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers, supra note
5, at 723 (suggesting that clinic participants learn to challenge socletal hierarchy to achieve
substantive justice).
10. Even commentators that view clinics as doing more than "practice" or "skills" training
usually describe the clinic as a "practice" or "skills" place. See Baker, supra note 5, at 289-90
(stating that although clinic education is generally available to only 30% of students for minimal
course credit, "practical experience in the clinic is the only 'live' experience of lawyering by law
students that is significantly validated by The MacCrate Report'); Arthur B. LaFrance, Clinical
Education: "To Turn Ideals into Effective Vision, -44 S. CAL. L. REV. 624, 625 (1971) (noting that
practitioners, who once advocated for apprenticeships, shouldsupport clinical education because
it "prepare [s] new attorneys for such practical tasks as drafting wills, using forms, working under
pressure and finding the courthouse"); Spiegel, supra note 5, at 590 (explaining that original
purpose for clinical education was "skills training" and concluding that "this equating of clinical
education with skills training further reinforced the idea that clinical education is inherentlypractical"). But see Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spira4 supra note 5, at 1605 (theorizing that
feminists, in addition to clinical educators, recognize "the interlacing of theory and practice"
and, therefore, understand that inquiring "whether law school classes should cultivate
professional skills or advance a broad intellectual agenda" is unintelligible).
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own cause through not only their incantation of words like "skills"
and "practice,"" but also their historical renditions of legal educa-
tion as comprised of distinct practical and theoretical eras, with the
latter born impugning the former.
12
Also, legal education critics, who discuss the need to put more of
the practical in the curriculum, typically season their articles with
snippets from Legal Education and Professional Development-An
Educational Continuum: Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the
Profession: Narrowing the Gap (The MacCrate Report). Many such
commentators, however, either omit or downplay the fact that one of
the progenitors of some central Macrate motifs was King Edward I of
England. 4
It was Edward I who helped activate the creation of the Inns of
Court at the end of the thirteenth century, which was the method for
preparing young men for the English legal profession for more than
11. Some law professors have actually confronted the mind-set that the association between
clinics and skills is denigrating. See Leonard D. Pertnoy, Skills Is Not a Dirty Word, 59 MO. L. REV.
169, 169 (1994) (arguing that association ofskills with clinical training should not be considered
denigrating and urging integration of skills training with socratic methodology and analytical
doctrine). But see Nina W. Tarr, Current Issues in Clinical Legal Education, 37 HOW. Lj. 31, 35
(1993) (arguing that by referring to clinical education as "skills training" in order to make it
more appealing to legal academics, some positive aspects of clinical education, including its
political underpinnings, are diminished).
12. See Pertnoy, supra note 11, at 174-75 (using competition between apprenticeships and
law schools in late 18th century as illustration of traditional distinction between theory and
practice); Linda F. Smith, The Judicial Clinic: Theory and Method in a Live Laboratny of Law, 1993
UTAH L. REV. 429, 430-35 (discussing change in focus of clinical programs from emphasis on
simulating courtroom experience to focusing on changing social policy to current focus of
gaining practical experience in criminal,juvenile, and porerty law areas); Spiegel, supra note 5,
at 581-86 (arguing that practice-based model of legal education was replaced by scientific
model); Ralph S. Tyler & Robert S. Catz, The Contradictions of Clinical Legal Education, 29 CLEv.
ST. L. REV. 693, 697 (1980) (noting that law professors were originally hired for their trial
experience but now are hired for their legal scholarship).
13. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION:
NARROWING THE GAP (1992) [hereinafter THE MACCRATE REPORT]. After a three-year study of
the alleged gap between the needs of the law profession and the current law school curriculum,
the task force "concluded that there is no 'gap.'" Id. at 8. Rather, it stated that "[t]here is only
an arduous road of professional development along which all prospective lawyers should travel."
Id. Yet, the report identified the following lawyering skills as necessary components in legal
education: "problem solving, legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, factual investigation,
communication, counseling, negotiating, litigation, alternative dispute resolution procedures,
organization and management of legal work and recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas."
Id. For an example of the report's influence on legal education scholarship, see Tarr, supra note
11, at 32 (noting that "many law schools will be re-evaluating the clinical and skills components
of their curriculums" because of findings in The MacCrate Report).
14. SeeALBERTJ. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1953) (noting that
Edward I directed judges to take apprentices and teach them law); 2 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 314-15 (1923) (arguing that Edward I's appointment of 140 legal
apprentices resulted in new systematic arrangement of legal education in England); Pertnoy,
supra note 11, at 174 (noting that Edward I created Inns of Court that exposed aspiring legal
practitioners to moot court arguments and mock lawsuits).
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three centuries. 5 By about the seventeenth century, apprenticeships
almost entirely eclipsed the simulated lawsuits and moot arguments,
which were the predominant features of the Inns' training.'6 The
legal apprenticeship system was imported into the new world 7 and,
as at least one commentator has pointed out, private law schools and
college-based legal education eventually supplemented the hands-on
practitioner training."
A contemporary discussion of the apprenticeship model portrays it
as "wholly practical."19 Really, it is untenable that this or anything
putatively pragmatic is devoid of theory. That is, if we ascribe to any
derivative of cogito ergo sum20 or, at least, accept it as gnomic that part
of what makes us alive is our capacity to think and if we also believe
that thinking entails the extrapolation of general explanations of
particular phenomena,2' and if we also surmise that Inns and
apprenticeships had in their regiments some living thinkers, then we
should likewise conclude that theory had to have permeated that
practical "doing" sphere.2 Nevertheless, many historians have
dubbed Christopher Columbus Langdell, Dean of Harvard Law
School from 1870 to 1885, the knight of a separate theory movement
in legal education.23
For Dean Langdell, legal education ensued from a scientific study
of the law through the case method and, of course, "consist[ed] of
15. See HARNO, supra note 14, at 6 (noting that education at Inns of Court typically lasted
for seven to ten years and included studies of singing, music, dancing, history, discipline, and
virtue, in addition to law).
16. See HARNO, supra note 14, at 7 (noting that Inns' teaching methodology consisted of
"bolts," theoretical cases, and "moots," mock lawsuits, tried by students).
17. SeePertnoy, supra note 11, at 175 (explaining that early colonists brought English system
of legal apprenticeship training to America).
18. SeeSTEvENS, supra note 9, at 3-4 (noting that college-based approach to teaching law was
similar to science).
19. See Hoeflich, supra note 5, at 125 (discussing practical merits of apprenticeship model
such as networking, community relations, relative inexpense, and production of great lawyers).
20. Rene Descartes, Meditation II: Of the Nature of the Human Mind, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
DESCARTES 214, 227 (John Veitch trans. & ed., 1901) (translating loosely as "I think therefore
I am").
21. SeeSpiegel, supranote 5, at 580,595-97 (arguing that definitions affect conceptualization
of subjective phenomena).
22. See HOLiSWORTH, supra note 14, at 481 (calling Inns "a very practical system" in which
"theory was not neglected" because it produced pleaders and advocates, as well as accomplished
lawyers).
23. See Hoeffich, supra note 5, at 140 (arguing that current failure to integrate theory and
practice in legal education results from Langdell's influence); Harold A. McDougall, Social
Movements, Law, and Implementation: A Clinical Dimension for the New Legal Process, 75 CORNELL L.
REv. 83, 88 (1989) (stating that apprenticeship model is better merger of law and science than
Langdell's case-based model, despite contrary belief by Langdell); Spiegel, supra note 5, at 581
(stating that "theoretical" label of case-based education stems from Langdell's attempt to equate
law with science).
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:859
certain principles or doctrines."24 Possibly, because Langdell stressed
the importance of gleaning such principles from a text, some
Langdell interpreters see his method as wholly theoretical and
contrast it with the Inns and apprenticeship models. 5 Such a
reading of Langdell, however, is quite distortive and really approaches
the making of mythic allegory.26
As Dean Hoeflich more accurately states, "Langdell, like his
predecessors, accepted that legal education had to integrate both
theory and practice, to include both the lecture room and the moot
court exercise."27 Also, as Dean Hoeflich explains, "Langdell and his
contemporaries, like Butler and Hoffman[,] ... also assumed that a
lawyer's education would take place both in the law school and in the
law office."21 More basically, the Langdellian process, which entails
the anatomization of cases, implicates the finding of similarities and
distinctions between such cases.29 That process is surely germane to
practice. Specifically, it is seminal to the doing of legal analysis or the
formulation of a legal argument.
Interestingly, early critics of the case method-the very ones that
contributed to the eventual integration of more skills courses and
clinics into law school curricula-somehow furthered the solidification
of an ostensible wall between the supposed terrains of practice and
theory. Professor Jerome Frank, in condemning the law school as
"too academic and too unrelated to practice," argued that law schools
should include work in actual legal offices and courts."0 Similarly,
Professor Karl Llewellyn urged law schools to "deliberately set to work
to plan an interstitial apprenticeship" and lamented that "law school
24. C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRATS vi (1871).
25. SeeJohnJ. Costonis, The MacCrate Report: Of Loaves, Fishes and the Future of American
LegalEducation, 43J. LEGAL EDUC. 157, 160 (1993) (interpreting Langdell's method of education
as "a science," not "a craft," because it occurred in "the law school," not in "the law office");
Pertnoy, supra note 11, at 175 (attributing Langdell with causing shift in emphasis from skills
acquisition to scientific study through case method); Spiegel, supra note 5, at 581 (arguing that
Langdell's equation of law to science introduced theoretical component of case methodology).
26. See Hoeflich, supra note 5, at 140 (stating that to interpret Langdellian method as "too
theoretical and doctrinal" reflects misapprehension of his theory).
27. Hoeflich, supra note 5, at 140.
28. Hoeflich, supra note 5, at 140. Hoeflich asserts that "[wie should not blame Langdell
for what we perceive as the increasing isolation of law school curriculum and pedagogical theory
from practice." Id.
29. See LAGDEJ.L, supra note 24, at vi-vii (suggesting that legal areas are best studied
through systematically selecting and classifying most influential cases).
30. STEVENs, supra note 9, at 156 (citingJerome Frank, Why Not a ClinicalLawyer-School?, 81
U. PA. L. REv. 907, 908-12 (1933)). But seeJerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE UJ.
1303, 1321 (1947) ("An interest in the practical should not preclude, on the contrary it should
invite, a lively interest in theory. For practices unavoidably blossom into theories, and most
theories induce practices good or bad.").
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is needlessly abstract, and needlessly removed from life."3 Implicit
in such views is the fictive image of a law student jarringly shifting
from the theoretical confines of the classroom to some antipodal
outside sphere of really practicing.
Even after the Ford Foundation awarded the Independent Council
on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility (ICLEPR) a
substantial grant for the funding of clinics and field work 2 and such
clinics began to infiltrate the traditional law school curriculum,3
there persisted a perceived lack of congeniality between the tradition-
al way and the "new" programs. Specifically, some faculty and
administrators saw the clinical newcomers as practitioner interlopers
and even as players in a marginal arena.' In fact, this mind-set
endures in spite of the mounting scholarship acknowledging the false
dichotomy between practice and theory and in spite of literature
touting the clinic as the very sims of theory-practice convergence.35
31. Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called LegalEducation, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
651, 675 (1935).
32. See STEVENS, supra note 9, at 230 n.95 (noting that Ford Foundation granted
approximately $6,000,000 to ICLEPR in June 1968).
33. See Pertnoy, supra note 11, at 176 (remarking that ICLEPR grants gave rise to
"explosion" of clinical programs in 1970s); Smith, supra note 12, at 435 (discussing substantial
impact of ICLEPR on traditional law school curriculum).
34. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, LAW, INTELLECT AND EDUCATION 69 (1979) (describing how
traditional faculty members have negative outlook on clinics); Eleanor M. Fox, The Good Law
School, the Good Curriculum, and the Mind and the Heart, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 473, 478 (1989)
(discussing academic faculty treatment of clinics and clinic faculty as "second class"); Arthur B.
LaFrance, Clinical Education and the Year 2010, 37J. LEGAL EDUC. 352, 355 (1987) (discussing
problematic costs of clinical programs); Tarr, supra note 11, at 35 (discussing how "political
underpinnings" of law school clinics can be controversial and thus, objectionable to certain
academic constituents); cf. Goldfarb, A Theog-Practice Spiral supra note 5, at 1667-74 (analyzing
methodological similarity between clinical education and feminist jurisprudence); Mark V.
Tushnet, Scenes from the Metropolitan Underground: A Critical Perspective on the Status of Clinical
Education, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 272, 274-75 (1984) (attributing marginal status of clinical
education to its association with female characteristics-its concern for people, unstructured
situations, and feelings-and concluding that such characteristics "make the men who dominate
law school extremely uncomfortable").
35. See Robert J. Condiin, "Tastes Great, Less Filling.• The Law School Clinic and Political
Critique, 36J. LECALEDUC. 45,47-48 (1986) (discussing analysis of lawyer skill practices in clinical
instruction elucidates how individual actions constitute legal rules and how legal system fits
together); Goldfarb, A Theoa-Practice Spiral supra note 5, at 1667 (demonstrating convergence
through comparison of clinic to feministjurisprudence); Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers, supranote
5, at 720-23 (explaining that clinical legal educators engage in "theoretical deconstruction" by
examining lawyers' practices and theories upon which they are based to reform law practice and
legal system); Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 415 (arguing that convergence enables students to
understand human and social elements of legal practice); Howard Lesnick, Infinity in a Grain
of Sand" The World of Law and Lawyering as Portrayed in the Clinical Teaching Implicit in the Law
School Curriculum, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1157, 1158 (1990) (concluding that all legal teaching is
clinical teaching and should be viewed as such to eliminate needless labeling); Spiegel, supra
note 5, at 578 (concluding that choice to label academic classes as theoretical and clinic as
practical is mistaken because each has elements of other).
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Coterminous with the movement to bring more clinics into law
schools was support for improving education in particular areas like
appellate advocacy and professional responsibility. Many of the
complaints about these areas getting short shrift assailed what was
again described as that troublesome rift between the theoretical
academy and the practice world.
Although The MacCrate Report identified a working knowledge of
appellate litigation as an aspect of lawyering competency, 6 there has
waxed, and continues to wax, grumbling from the judiciary about an
epidemic of appellate sloppiness.3 7 At least one critic traces the
source of the problem to how "appellate litigation is still primarily
taught in first-year research and writing programs and student-run
moot court competitions, both of which do more harm than good in
teaching how to be an advocate in a real appellate court."' In fact,
the Appellate Judges Conference in July 1985,11 approved a report
that essentially blamed law schools for bad appellate work because the
schools failed to replicate real life appellate experience:
First and foremost, the [traditional appellate advocacy] programs
treat appellate litigation as involving only two aspects-writing a
brief and making an oral argument. They ignore all of the other
important ingredients of appellate litigation.... Second, andjust
as fundamental, because they lack a realistic appeal record they do
not aid in the development of the skill that is unique to appellate
litigation: building a case out of a record. Third, as a result of the
first two defects, the issues argued in these programs are usually
abstract legal questions without factual content upon which most
appeals are decided.'
Such a critique is especially intriguing because it takes what has
traditionally been viewed as one of the few law school token accom-
modations of "the practical"-the moot court model that emphasizes
the actual doing of briefs and oral arguments-and brands that very
36. THE MACGRATE REPORT, supra note 13, at 139.
37. See RUGGEROJ. ALDiSERT, WINNING ON APPEAL: BErtER BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS
6 (1992) (citing poor level of appellate advocacy from vantage point of federal appellate judges);
Committee on Appellate Skills Training, Appellate Litigation Skills Training. The Role of the Law
Schools, 54 U. GIN. L. REv. 129, 141-44 (1985) [hereinafter Appellate Judges' Conference Report]
(suggesting comprehensive program to teach appellate advocacy in law school).
38. RobertJ. Martineau, 43J. LEGAL EDUC. 307,309 (1993) (reviewingALDISERT, supranote
37).
39. The ABA's Judicial Administrative Division established The Appellate Judges'
Conference, which was spurred by suggestions fromJustice Robert Bakes of the Supreme Court
of Idaho andJudgeJoseph Sneed of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit of the need
to focus on the role of legal education in training appellate litigators. See Appellate Judges'
Conference Repor4 supra note 37, at 129-30.
40. AppellateJudges' Conference Report, supra note 37, at 142.
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program as defective for not being real. Implicit in such an attack is
an assumed polarization of practice and theory and the notion that
even the attempted duplicated doing of appellate practice with its
platitudinous moot-court-two-step of brief and oral argument still
gravitates much too close to some theoretical axis.
Another critic of legal education also isolates the teaching of
professional responsibility as a prime candidate for improvement."
This too is not something new. In fact, "professional responsibility"
is part of the ICLEPR's title and focus.' William Pincus, described
as ICLEPR's "moving force,"'43 argued that clinics could effectively
teach professional responsibility,' an area which embraces an
understanding of the roles of lawyers and of injustice in various legal
institutions.45
In urging an alliance between clinics and professional responsibility
training, such advocates again implicitly foster the sense that a
separation exists between practice and theory. Specifically, the
"clinical" assessment was that the abstract study of ethical codes was
the theoretical thing that could not alone do what ChiefJustice Burger
once said that law schools fail to do-"inculcate sufficiently the
necessity- of high standards of professional ethics, manners and
etiquette as things basic to the lawyers' function."'
This Essay's narrow thesis is that an in-house appellate clinic is
especially suited for the fusion of theory and practice. The practice
of building a case out of a real record, formulating legal points, and
grappling with precedent and policy considerations infuses itself with
theory so that the process becomes a theoretical doing. Also,
appellate work, by its very nature, encourages self-consciousness-so
much so that the whole process of working on an appeal transforms
41. See Edwards, supra note 5, at 38 ("Law students need concrete ethical training. They
need to know why pro bono work is so important They need to understand their duties as
'officers of the court.... They need to have great ethical teachers and to have every teacher
address ethical problems where such problems arise.").
42. See STEVENS, supra note 9, at 24041 (discussing ICLEPR program and its focus on
clinical education).
43. Smith, supra note 12, at 435 (identifying Pincus as President of ICLEPR).
44. See Smith, supra note 12, at 435 (stating Pincus' belief that clinics could teach
professional responsibility by exposing students to "the injustices of legal institutions"); see also
Report of the Committee, supra note 4, at 513-14 (discussing teaching professional responsibility in
in-house clinical programs); infra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing how clinics force
students to challenge their own values).
45. See Smith, supra note 12, at 435 (suggesting that exposure to real problems would
reinforce sensitivity in future lawyers).
46. Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification
of Advocates Essential to Our System ofJustice., 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 227, 232 (1973); see also Report
of the Committee, supra note 4, at 51-14 (noting that clinicians do not just teach awareness of
rules, they develop ethical understanding).
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itself into a doingness theory where the participants emerge with
general propositions not just about the appellate process, but about
practice and life itself.
This Essay aims to show how an in-house appellate clinic synthesizes
theory and practice while it trains students in appellate advocacy and
professional responsibility. In Part I of this Essay, I describe my in-
house appellate clinic and summarize five of its objectives. Part I
attempts to show how such an in-house clinic can unite theory and
practice.
In Part II, which is the Essay's real core, I focus on two of our
appellate clinic's lessons in professional responsibility. Part II
demonstrates how professional responsibility issues become entangled
with the process of appellate work. What occurs in this educational
mode is not just the syncretistic theory-practice experience, but also
a crystallization for students of what should be an unremarkable
realization that their identities as lawyers can be compatible with their
identities as human beings. The use of narrative in Part II stems from
my agreement with those that validate a form of "consciousness
raising,"' and from my acquiescence in Professor Peter Marguiles'
belief that stories, among other things, "do not reduce to categories"
but they "demonstrate that action in the world requires the constant
dialogue of theory and practice."'
In the conclusion, I revisit Walter Pater's analysis of artistic
achievement. In that respect, I develop the Essay's inaugural conceit
and try to further define what I see as a real affinity between in-house
appellate clinical education and music.
I. THE IN-HOUSE APPELLATE CLINIC: AN OVERVIEW OF FIVE
OBJECTnVS
I run an in-house appellate clinic, which has about ten to fourteen
third-year law students.49 Under the student practice rules," the
Florida Supreme Court certifies these students as legal interns, which
allows them to appear in any Florida court.5 '
47. Goldfarb, A Theoty-Practice Spiral, supra note 5, at 1630, 1631-34 (discussing use of
narrative to empower women's groups overlooked by traditional feminist scholars).
48. Peter Marguiles, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civil
Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 695, 697 (1994).
49. For an account of how I started the clinic, see Amy D. Ronner, Real Students, Real
Appeals, Real Courts: The In-House Appellate Litigation Clinic at St. Thomas University School of Law,
II THE RECORD: J. APPELLATE PRAC. & ADVOC. SEC. FIA. B. 13 (1994).
50. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 11-1 (Harrison 1993 & Supp. 1995).
51. Id. 11-1.2(b) ("An eligible law student may appear in any court or before any
administrative tribunal in this state on behalf of any indigent person .... ").
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This two-semester course aims to give each student an opportunity
to work on about two appeals and participate in one oral argument.
In running the clinic, I minister to at least five basic goals, which
because of the nature of appellate work itself and because of the in-
house format of the clinic, are so intertwined that their isola-
tion-even for the purpose of this discussion-is admittedly quite
artificial.
One, the appellate clinic aspires to be an education in appellate
practice and procedure. That is, I devote a portion of the class
sessions to an exploration of the state and federal appellate rules.
Through a series of exercises, denominated "Rules Gymnastics," the
students confront problems that can and do arise with respect to
appellate jurisdiction: the notice of appeal, extraordinary writs, the
record, preservation of issues, briefs, oral argument, motions,
rehearings, and further appellate review.
While it is apodictic that "[o]ne of the primary goals in teaching
modes of analysis and professional skills is to provide means by which
students can learn from experience,"52 and the "Rules Gymnastics"
aspect of the clinic consists primarily of hypothetical problems,
experience infiltrates the exercises through both the front and back
doors.
Specifically, my decision to incorporate this component into the
course stems from my own experience as an appellate practitioner
who for years entertained questions-mostly from trial attorneys-that
the rules themselves unambiguously answered. My epiphany, albeit
rather unremarkable, was that so many practitioners-even some of
the finest-stubbornly resisted pulling a rule book from the shelf or
accessing a rule on their screen. An affiliated impasse was just the
basic inability of attorneys to really read a rule (as opposed to a case),
a debilitation which could conceivably be traced to our rearing in the
Langdellian universe where cases tend to monopolize the syllabi."
Thus, my aspiration was to have a class of student lawyers, who by the
end of their third year, could flip through the rules as easily as they
turned their keys in auto ignitions.
52. Report of the Committee, supra note 4, at 513; cf Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal
Education-A 21st Century Pespectiv, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612, 615-16 (1984) ("When we were
students, law school did absolutely nothing to prepare us to learn from our experience after
graduation. Law school was conceived as a wholly self-contained and terminal educational
episode.").
53. See Amsterdam, supra note 52, at 613 (discussing traditional law school method of
teaching students to dissect judicial opinions and apply holdings to other factual hypotheticals);
LaFrance, supra note 10, at 628-29 (positing that Langdell, who developed case method
approach, did not anticipate increased importance of statutory law in legal profession); Spiegel,
supra note 5, at 582 (noting Langdell's belief that "cases were the law's raw empirical data").
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Experience also comes into "Rules Gymnastics" in the form of the
backward glance. Students, in the process of handling their own
appeals, often have a specie of d~ja vu as they recognize an issue from
one of their past "Rules Gymnastics"' problems. As an example, in
one class we explored the Florida statute and appellate rule that
enumerate the particular dispositions that the State can appeal in a
criminal case.54 After I presented to the students questions with
respect to the State's relatively limited opportunity to appeal, one
student suggested that perhaps double jeopardy principles were
breathing behind such appellate provisions.
Only a few months later, the clinic had an appeal in which the State
sought review of a trial court's dismissal of charges against our client.
In the course of discussing the case, one student blurted out, "Why
isn't this one of those double jeopardy things we talked about in
Rules Gymnastics?" Out of this query sprang an argument that the
trial court's dismissal was tantamount to a judgment of acquittal and
thus, the order was not appealable. Consequently, the students
successfully moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In
so doing, the students dealt with notjust the statute and the rule, but
also the constitutional basis behind them.
The students' work on their cases also propels them into expanding
what is still their rudimentary grasp of certain substantive areas,
including evidence, constitutional law, and criminal law. For example,
in one appeal, the students represented an individual who had been
found guilty of first degree murder and arson by reason of insanity
and was involuntarily committed to the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services. Before requesting a reversal of the trial
court's denial of a request to transfer our client to a less restrictive
civilian facility,55 the students had to research the law with respect to
not only involuntary commitment, but also the separation of powers
doctrine.
In another appeal, the students represented an adjudicated
delinquent whose mother was a single welfare recipient with five
children. The students' effort to obtain the reversal of a restitution
award imposed upon their client's mother forced them to explore the
54. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 924.07 (Harrison 1991) (providing that state may appeal order
dismissing indictment, order granting new trial, order arresting judgment, illegal sentence, or
order adjudicating defendant insane); FIA. R. APP. P. 9.140(c) (providing appellate procedures
for filing, service, and notice).
55. The decision, Quiala v. State, is reported at 19 Fla. L. Weekly D1503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994).
870
1996] MUSICAL STORIES OF CANDOR AND THE SANDBAG 871
history of restitution and to define the appropriate means of
establishing the value of stolen goods.
Still another clinic appeal was from the denial of post-conviction
relief. A jury had convicted our client of conspiring to murder a
judge in Palm Beach County, Florida. 6 Although the issue on
appeal was the ineffectiveness of our client's defense counsel, the
matter motivated the students to do an in-depth study of the
disqualification of trial judges, unconstitutional jury systems, the
retroactive application of new law, and the prejudicial impact of
various arguably erroneous rulings.
What transpires when clinic students reach out into several different
areas of the law is growth along with the fulmination of meaningful
chaos. Stated differently, the once seemingly indestructible partitions
between putatively separate course subjects, each housed in its own
case book-red or blue-crumble as students are hurled into the
eclecticism of law. I do not agree, however, that the clinical experi-
ence is what Professor Mark Tushnet has suggested might be
associated with the "feminine."57 I find it is the somewhat unsettling
genderlessness of things that preliminarily defy order.
Two, the appellate clinic is designed to be an arduous journey into
the process, frustration, and artistry of legal writing. Although I
usually assign two students to every appeal, each individual must
produce her or his own brief. For each appeal, which takes the
students step-by-step through the brief-drafting and revision process,
I tailor a separate work schedule with strict deadlines. After the
students complete satisfactory individual drafts, I meet with each team
in conference to guide them in the combining of their individual
products into a team brief. After the creation of the team brief, the
students do about four or five rewrites. I intersperse these with
conferences.
The revision process eventually culminates in an "Editing Team
Meeting," which the students have coined "The Meeting from Hell."
In this notorious conference, all three of us revise and edit the brief
together. At this juncture, our predominant tool is the human ear:
we read most of the brief aloud and as we go, we chop sections, re-
56. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, Walker v. State, 552 So. 2d 333 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1989), and our client, seeking post-conviction relief, moved to vacate, set aside, or
correct the sentence. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.840. After denial of that motion, the trial court
appointed the clinic to pursue the appeal.
57. Tushnet, supra note 34, at 274 (asserting that clinical education may be characterized
as female because it encompasses experiences that relate to feelings).
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order arguments, truncate sentences, and rehabilitate most passive
constructions with active transplants.
The writing aspect of the in-house clinic substantiates what some
legal educators have explained as the reason why many students do
not write well in traditional class settings-namely, the students'
proclivity to place little importance on what they are writing.58 As
one advocate of the clinical experience has stated, "The real world
consequences of the clinic give students strong incentives to improve
their writing" simply because "[s] tudents are more motivated to write
when they feel that a task must be accomplished and when they
believe that their writing will be taken seriously." 9
In this respect, the students' participation in the appellate process
constitutes one of the most powerful testimonials to the potential
power of the written product. Students typically embark on the
appellate clinic with an eager anticipation of just the oral argument,
which they aggrandize as the climactic event. To the appellate
neophyte, the oral argument is seen as the sexy thing-their moment
of "real" lawyering.
By the time the students are about to graduate, their change in
attitude is quite dramatic. All of them have written briefs in which
they asserted from one to four points and all of them have held in
their hands the court orders setting oral argument, which often gave
them a paltry ten minutes. Almost all of the students have stepped
up to that podium and experienced the distorted rapidity of the
passage of their allotted time. After that oral argument, the appellate
brief undergoes an apotheosis as students comfort themselves with the
fact that they did indeed painstakingly flesh out the policy analysis or
meticulously distinguish the very case that our opposing counsel kept
chanting was the deathblow to the clinic's position.
Three, the appellate clinic aims to be an experience in oral
advocacy. Because the students actually do the oral arguments in the
appellate court, they adhere to a rigorous preparation schedule in
which they practice at least a dozen times before me and before a
58. SeeAngelaJ. Campbell, Teaching Advanced Legal Writing in a Law School Clinic, 24 SETON
HALL L REV. 653, 653-54 (1993) (arguing that students in clinic place greater importance on
their writing because they have more at stake).
59. Id. at 659-60; see alsoJohn M. Burman, Out-of-Class Assignments as a Method of Teaching and
Evaluating Law Students, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 447, 450 (1992) ("1 had the student in three
traditional classes .... The student consistently wrote C exams. Yet his class participation always
indicated a much higher level of understanding. In the clinic, that understanding blossomed.");
AppellateJudges' Conference Report. supra note 37, at 129 ("As an employer, often of second year
law clerks with little more than a first year of law school, I see about 100 moot court briefs a year
drawn from the national student market; they are the typical writing sample. For research,
writing or advocacy, they are not worth much.").
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panel of other clinic students. Much of the emphasis here is on
combatting the knee-jerk impulse to shun the hard question and
coddle the favorable. The apex of achievement in this regard is when
a student transforms the very thing that enervates her position into
the most potent ammunition.
Also, a part of the oral advocacy training is the opportunity for
students to argue the other side in their own appeals. This exercise,
of course, assists the students in anticipating what could be a primary
concern at the actual oral argument and sometimes helps them figure
out what they need to emphasize in their own briefs.
Four, the appellate clinic gives students experience interacting with
others. In the process of working on the appeals, students occasional-
ly discover that their own moral judgments-ones they have somehow
imposed on clients convicted of offenses that they have branded as
"heinous"-can render them from either apoplectic to less effec-
tive. 60
Also, students doing appellate work, which is indeed "special-
ized,"61 sometimes collide with serious communication barriers and
out of that impact, realize how difficult it really is to convey to a client
the limitations of what can be accomplished on appeal. We have
devoted, in fact, class time to discussing the frustration of trying to
make the involuntarily-committed-insanity acquittee understand that
victory in his particular appeal cannot be outright release, but, at best,
an improved quality of life in confinement. We have also discussed
ways of making our client, one convicted of battery on a police
officer, understand that we could not present to the appellate tribunal
the two supposed defense witnesses that, according to him, his trial
counsel "hid" from the jury. In this respect, we have further
confronted the disquieting mission of making that client grasp that re-
trying his case in the appellate court is a literal impossibility and not
some covertly hostile unwillingness on our part to help.
Five, the clinic becomes a lesson in teamwork. As the academic
year progresses, something significant occurs: students actually
congeal as a working unit. My syllabus is designed to force them to
not merely myopically fixate on just the cases to which they are
assigned. Instead, they must contend with issues and problems that
arise in all pending clinic cases. The students read each other's briefs
60. Cf. Marguiles, supra note 48, at 697 (offering two stories about individuals who came to
his clinic seeking legal services and exploring students' responses to them).
61. SeeALDISERT, supra note 37, at 4 (suggesting that appellate advocacy skills are different
from skills used in other areas of law); AppelateJudges' Conference Report, supra note 37, at 147
(noting importance of clinical instructor's qualifications in specialized programs).
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and help prepare each other for their oral arguments. In fact, most
students voluntarily attend almost all of the appellate arguments and
wait until the end to applaud their colleague on the courthouse steps.
II. TWO STORIES oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIITY
Professional responsibility is an expansive domain, one which
Professor David Barnhizer has described as including
judgments and value orientations that become both an explicit and
implicit part of the individual's decisi6nmaking and professional
behavior. The achieving of this level of understanding demands
educational experiences that are capable of providing a source and
kind of involvement penetrating enough to cultivate the clarifica-
tion of values, and flexible enough to allow the instructor to guide
the experience into a functional structure. This level of under-
standing is developed not in sole relation to intellectual theories of
ethical behavior, but in response to the kinds of actual forces that
will confront, challenge, and tend to seduce the person as a
lawyer.6
2
A clinic lends itself to the training of professional responsibility6 1
because it is elastic: it brings all kinds of experiences to the students
that inevitably force them to explore their own judgments and values,
the very ones that percolate within the decisions they do and must
make as lawyers.
In an appellate clinic, professional responsibility training cannot be
isolated into a lesson unto itself, but pervades all of the clinic's
educational objectives. Specifically, it breathes within appellate
practice and procedure and is inextricable from the clinic's journey
into the artistry of legal writing and oral advocacy. Professional
responsibility, also, comprehends the students' interactions with each
other and the clients, trial counsel, and the courts.
62. David K. Barnhizer, Clinical Education at the Crossroads: The NeedforDirection, 1977 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 1025, 1035.
63. For discussions of how clinics are especially suited for the teaching of professional
responsibility, see Lester Brickman, Contributions of Clinical Programs to TrainingforProfessionalism,
4 CoNN. L. REV. 437,444-45 (1971-72) (stating that clinical environment is conducive to raising
student awareness and sensitivity to inequities in legal system and suggesting that clinical
instructors can expand students' knowledge about professional responsibility issues by
introducing selected materials such as code provisions, case law, and articles to be used in class
discussion); Steve H. Leleiko, Love, Professional Responsibility, The Rule of Law and Clinical Legal
Education, 29 CLEv. ST. L REv. 641, 653-56 (1980) (discussing opportunity for student to gain
hands-on, practical experience' in clinical setting); Report of the Committee, supra note 4, at 513-14
(expressing that clinics provide opportunity for students to grow as part of learning professional
responsibility). But seeRobert Condlin, The Moral Failure of Clinical Legal Education, in THE GOOD
LAWYER: LAWYES' ROLEs AN LAWsER' wTHIcs 317,326 (David Luban ed., 1984) (asserting that
clinic students are often "more zealous at modeling and imitating dominating and manipulative
behavior" than other non-clinic students).
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What emerges in the clinical context is an incipient integration of
the students' identities as lawyers with their identities as human
beingsf' They come to feel and even articulate that the ethical and
moral dilemmas they face while in their "legal" personae have a
meaningful nexus to the choices they make and will always make
about how they want to live their lives as people.
It is here that I resort to narrative because it is an appropriate way
of not just talking about, but actually capturing the clinical experi-
ence.65 One of the reasons that stories are "in vogue in academic
circles"66 is that they can induce empathy and raise consciousness.
6 7
This is especially true when the narrative voice emanates from an
oppressed member of what has been treated as an excluded or
subordinated "group." As Professor Richard Delgado has said,
"Stories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are powerful means for
destroying mindset-the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms,
and shared understandings against a background of which legal and
political discourse takes place."6
Undoubtedly, storytelling and appellate practice are yokemates on
several planes. In every appeal, there is, of course, the client's story.
So many criminal appeals indeed harbor those "stories from the
bottom"69 and thus, narrative can serve to penetrate bias and foster
64. For a comparison of a student with clinical experience to that of a traditional law school
student, see Roger C. Crampton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 247, 259-60 (1978). Crampton describes the fhilure of the hired-gun law school model
as follows:
In law school he is asked to argue both sides of many issues. It is common for a
student to respond to the question, "How do you come out on this case?" with the
revealing reply, "It depends on what side I'm on." If the lawyer is going to live with
himself, the system seems to say, he can't worry too much about right and wrong.
Many sensitive students are deeply troubled by the moral implications of this role, and
law school generally provides little help in resolving the problem.
KL; see also Leleiko, supra note 63, at 642 ("The professional values which legal education
emphasizes appear, and often are, antithetical to the motivating desires and needs of many
students who focus on the 'helping' and 'loving' roles of the lawyer.").
65. See Marguiles, supra note 48, at 697 (discussing merits of narrative in learning about
difference).
66. Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spira4 supra note 5, at 1630.
67. See Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spira4 supra note 5, at 1630-34 (describing how personal
stories are often more effective in raising consciousness than relying solely on teaching theory);
see also Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of Schook An Essay on Legal
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807, 809 (1993) (noting significance of "legal storytelling" in legal
scholarship).
68. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrativ 87 MICH.
L. REv. 2411, 2413 (1989). Professor Delgado has apparently questioned his earlier position on
speech. SeelRichard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture:
Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social ls?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1258-59 (1992) (arguing
against absolute First Amendment protections as they relate to social problems).
69. Farber & Sherry, supra note 67, at 808, 819 (using "stories from the bottom" as means
of raising consciousness regarding societal oppression).
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empathy in what is typical-a conservative bench, sometimes one with
an extreme pro-government and law enforcement perspective. The
omnipresent appellate problem of how to release the client's story
from what is often the bastille of the record compounds an already
difficult task. That is, the appellate scop must balance the desire to
sing the client's story with the necessity of not doing what dehors the
record, which is the product of the story that trial counsel has already
told or imposed on the client.70
On another plane, every appeal has the story of the case, which
does not just belong to the client. The case story belongs equally to
trial counsel, who through action has authored an account of her
travails in the trial court on behalf of the client. Because in criminal
appeals defense counsel frequently shares some of the debilitating
preconceptions that courts harbor with respect to the client, the story
of the case can be another consciousness-raising feat.
In the process of wielding both the client's narrative and the case
story, new stories are born out of experiences on the appellate plane
itself. Because such experiences involve moral sensibility, values and
judgments, such stories on appeal usually fall within the parameters
of what we call professional responsibility.
Because in legal education the clinic still has a perceived inferior
and even marginal status,71 narrative again can be offered as a "story
from the bottom,"72 as a form of consciousness-raising and, at least,
as a viable lesson-sharing essay. What makes the two following stories
significant is that they are neither momentous nor extraordinary.
A. The Candor
The story of candor was born in what appeared at first to be a near
certain loser. Our client was a juvenile who the trial court had
adjudicated delinquent for violating a criminal statute that proscribed
70. For a discussion of lawyers' legalistic imposition of stories on clients, see Anthony V.
Alfieri, Stances, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1233, 1234 (1992) (advancing alternative modes of client
discourse to prevent domination by lawyer in lawyer-client relationship); Clark D. Cunningham,
The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77
CORNELL L. REv. 1298, 1301 (1992) (explaining that dients are often silenced by lawyers); Lucie
E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G.,
28 BuFF. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1990) (noting that legal discourse, like politics, often precludes sub-
ordinated groups from "meaningful participation").
71. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing faculty and administrative
skepticism about clinical education despite scholarship praising its merits).
72. Farber & Sherry, supra note 67, at 808.
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a child's use of BB-guns, air or gas-operated guns, electric weapons or
devices, or firearms.
Defense counsel had moved to dismiss the charge in the court
below on the ground that the penalty portion of the statute provides
for the punishment of only the parent or guardian of the minor child
who had used one of the specified weapons.74 After a hearing, the
trial court rejected the defense's motion and interpreted the penalty
provision of the statute as applicable to the child himself.
On appeal, we sought a reversal of the trial court's order denying
the motion to dismiss and the adjudication of delinquency. When I
accepted the appeal for the appellate litigation clinic, I was aware of
the fact that there was only one decision, In re WO.C.,75 interpreting
the penalty provision of the statute. Although W 0. C. was decided in
another jurisdiction,76 the decision was squarely against us. In fact,
an outside criminal defense attorney tactfully suggested that we might
ultimately decide to file an Anders brief, which is the procedure for a
criminal appeal that lacks a meritorious issue.77
In W.O.C., the State had charged a child with violating the same
statute and the appellate court had said point blank that the statute
created "a criminal offense, subjectingjuvenile offenders to arrest and
prosecution."' Lamentably, the situation in W.O.C. was indistin-
guishable from that in our case. In handing the appeal over to the
students, however, I was resolved not to mention this decisional
blemish.
Not unexpectedly, a group of students rushed forthwith into my
office as if they were in the throes of a life-or-death emergency with
copies of WO.C. flapping in their hands. At first, they tried to
73. FIA. STAT. ANN. ch. 790.22(1) (Harrison 1991) (prohibiting "use for any purpose
whatsoever of BB guns, air or gas-operated guns, electric weapons or devices, or firearms ... by
any child under the age of 16 ... unless such use is under the supervision and in the presence
of an adult").
74. RA . STAT. ANN. ch. 790.22(2) provides:
Any adult responsible for the welfare of any child under the age of 16 years who
knowingly permits such child to use or have in his possession any BB gun, air or gas-
operated gun, electric weapon or device, or firearm in violation of the provisions of
subsection (1) of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree.
75. In reW.O.C., 318 So. 2d 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
76. The Fourth District Court of Appeals decided W.O.C. and our appeal was before the
Third District Court of Appeals.
77. In Anders v. Califomia, the United States Supreme Court described the proper
procedure for attorneys to follow when they find that the record in a criminal appeal reflects
that there is no meritorious issue. 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Pursuant to this procedure, lawyers
must submit a brief providing any information that may be helpful to the client's appeal before
withdrawing from the case. I&
78. W.O.C., 318 So.2d at 148. Judge Mager, however, dissented and expressed his view that
the statute "does not create a criminal offense subjecting ajuvenile to arrest and prosecution."
Id (MagerJ., dissenting).
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convince me that we should simply "throw in the towel" and take
another case-one we could win. Alas, they informed me that the
Fourth District Court of Appeals had killed their argument and they
wanted me to understand that this was indeed one of those rare
funereal moments where they simply could not distinguish the
unfavorable precedent.
While the discussion of the crisis desultorily progressed, one
student, mentioning in a near whisper that she had actually consulted
the Rules of Professional Conduct, pointed out that the Rules did not
require us to disclose that bad case. Specifically, the Rules mandated
disclosure "to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdic-
tion"79 and we were not before the very district court80 that, as my
student put it, "did us dirt."
At this juncture, I made a valiant effort to repress what was almost
a reflexive impulse to express repulsion. Instead, we modulated into
a hashing over of the sort of things that could happen if we simply
concealed WO.C. from our tribunal. The students' prognostications
ranged from us winning the case to us losing and being sanctioned.
The students, in fact, even envisioned us having to submit to a public
flogging. Most of the initial predictions did not appear to ensue from
any moral or ethical twinges, but rather from purely cerebral theories
about what would be the best strategy on appeal or what approach
could bring us the victory trophy.
The turning point, however, came when a student, who appeared
quite troubled, inquired, "Professor Ronner, you wouldn't make us
hide the case? Because I just don't think I could be that kind of
person." After assuring them that I would not make anybody do
anything that made them feel uncomfortable about themselves as
people, we embarked on a hypothetical, one which contained a
caricatured portrait of a partner with whom I, as a new lawyer, had
actually once worked.
I quoted Mr. Partner verbatim-"Don't put the bad case in the
initial brief because the court might not find it and the dolts on the
other side probably won't either." From there, the students consid-
ered and even fought over how one might and should handle such a
directive from a superior. The motif that ultimately surfaced,
however, left the Rules of Professional Conduct and even our case far
79. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-3.3(a) (3) (Harrison 1993 & Supp. 1995) (prohibiting lawyer
from "knowingly" failing"to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controllingjurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by
opposing counsel").
80. See supra note 76 (noting appeal was in Third Circuit, not Fourth).
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behind: it issued forth in the form of the students' consensus about
a need to not bifurcate our lawyer identity from how we define
ourselves as people.
Because so few contemporary stories have happy endings, I would
like to relate that the "bad" case became the very hub of our initial
brief. We did not merely present W..O.C. to the court, but built our
argument around the reasons why the decision in WO.C. was wrong
and in the end, our court actually agreed with us. 1
B. The Sandbag
The sandbag story was born when our client, Mr. Gibson, was sitting
on a milk crate in front of a grocery store. Mr. Gibson is black and
many black people resided in the neighborhood where Mr. Gibson
was sitting.
When a police officer received an anonymous tip that a black man
was selling drugs in the area, he drove up to Mr. Gibson in his
marked police car. When Mr. Gibson got up and walked away, the
officer drove right in front of Mr. Gibson and blocked his path. The
officer later ordered Mr. Gibson to stop and Mr. Gibson stopped.
The officer told Mr. Gibson to place his hands on the police car and
Mr. Gibson again complied. When the officer told Mr. Gibson to
spread his legs, Mr. Gibson did that as well.
The officer then conducted a pat down of Mr. Gibson and pulled
a small brown bag out of his right pocket. The bag contained what
was later identified as crack cocaine. As a result, the officer arrested
Mr. Gibson and the State charged him with possession of cocaine.
Mr. Gibson's defense counsel had filed a motion to suppress the
evidence and after conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
deemed the search to be illegal and granted the motion. An Assistant
81. The State confessed error on the basis of a 1974 amendment to the Florida statute
dealing with classes and definitions of offenses. SeeFLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 775.08 (Harrison 1991)
(deleting language that provided that all crimes that are not felonies are misdemeanors). After
the amendment, prosecution for violations of Fla. Stat. Ann. ch. 790.22 could no longer be
maintained. See FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 790.22 (1992) (classifying crime as misdemeanor). The
State, however, did not confess error on the basis that we asserted-that the plain language of
Fla. Stat. Ann. ch. 790.22 subjected only adults (not children) to criminal sanctions. In agreeing
with us, the appellate court held, "The plain language of Section 790.22 indicates that an adult,
not the minor who engages in the proscribed activity, is guilty of a misdemeanor.... Section
790.22(1) prohibits the use of weapons by minors, but does not create a criminal offense
subjecting a minor to an adjudication of delinquency." JJ. v. State, 620 So. 2d 1139, 1140-41
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (citing W.O.C., 318 So. 2d at 148 (Mager,.J., dissenting)).
For me, however, an even happier ending occurred in the middle of a case that we lost.
When at oral argument, the student was distinguishing "the State's case," one judge on the panel
remarked with a detectable modicum of warmth, "It is curious that you call it 'the State's case'
because counsel wasn't it really you that first presented that case to this court?"
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Attorney General, acting on behalf of the State, appealed the decision
and our clinic represented Mr. Gibson, the appellee.
On the morning of the oral argument, we were waiting in the
lawyer's lounge in the courthouse when an Assistant Attorney General
glided in and plunked down on our table a "Notice of Supplemental
Authority" with a case, Minnesota v. Dickerson,2 appended to it. The
Assistant, however, made a point of informing us that because she was
filing the notice at "the last minute," she would neither argue it nor
mention it during the oral argument. 83 Almost automatically, we
agreed that we would not discuss it either.
After this seemingly innocuous encounter, Jeff, the one presenting
the oral argument, and I read and discussed the Dickerson decision.
Jeff correctly pointed out that the circumstances in Dickerson did not
materially differ from those in the many cases that we had already
addressed and distinguished in our brief.
Also, as Jeff saw it, the distinction between Dickerson and our case
actually supported our position-not the State's. Specifically, in Dick-
erson, the United States Supreme Court reiterated the language in
Terry v. Ohio,84 which allows officers to conduct a pat down search
"'to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon"'85
when that officer justifiably believes that "'the individual whose
suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and
presently dangerous."'86 Under Dickerson, when officers are conduct-
ing such a protective Terry search and they discover "nonthreatening
contraband," they may lawfully seize it.87
As Jeff analyzed it, our case did not even arguably fall into that
Terry-Dickerson exception because the officer who stopped Mr. Gibson
had testified that he did not believe that Mr. Gibson had a weapon or
that Mr. Gibson was dangerous. This was, in fact, something that the
students had already underscored in their brief.
At first, the oral argument was rather uneventful. The Assistant
Attorney General went first because the State was the appellant, and
even the purblind could see that the panel was not inclined to
82. 113 S. C. 2130 (1993).
83. See FLA. 1L App. P. 9.210(g) (providing that notice of supplemental authority may be
filed anytime "before a decision has been rendered").
84. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
85. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1993) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 24 (1968)).
86. 1& (quoting Teny, 392 U.S. at 24).
87. Id See generally Barbara A. Doty, Note, Minnesota v. Dickerson: Plain Touch Doc-
hine-Authorizing Terry Stop and Search for Drugs?, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 1303, 1313-15 (noting that
police may perform pat down but may not conduct more intrusive search without probable
cause).
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reverse. When Jeff stood up at the podium, all went quite well and
the court's questions were quite friendly to our position. Because the
Assistant Attorney General had set aside a minute or two for rebuttal,
the State, of course, had the final word. As her final word, the
Assistant Attorney General, appearing somewhat flushed and suddenly
ironically stammering like a Billy Budd, uttered Dickerson and argued
that her supplemental authority mandated a reversal.ts
Interestingly, while most assistants in the Attorney General's Office
tend to be quite cordial and usually make a point of stopping to
compliment the law students with a hearty handshake at the end of
the argument, this particular Assistant Attorney General dashed out
of the courthouse. We, however, huddled together in the heat of the
Miami parking lot to discuss our story, a pow-wow which continued
into the next class meeting. By then, some students had scrutinized
the deific Rules of Professional Conduct and were somewhat miffed
to discover that no provision precisely covered our event.
The students' reactions to the incident spanned the gamut of the
rational to the emotional. In articulating even some spiritual
concerns, the students referred to both heaven and karma. They, of
course, dwelled on what they thought it meant to be a lawyer, but a
truly sentient nugget, the one that is most memorable for me, is one
student's remark, "Gee, it must suck to be her."
CONCLUSION
In a paper delivered to the 1982 Plenary Session of the National
Clinical Law Teachers Conference,"9 Dean Michael Meltsner stated:
Law teachers can avoid talking about such changes that take place
in themselves and their students, but they cannot avoid influencing
and being influenced by them. For example, students are given the
opportunity to question-or not to question-the professional role
being handed down to them. They are given the opportunity to
consider-or not to consider-the interaction between their selves
and their work. The impact of such opportunities, gained or lost,
abides-regardless of whether we decide to acknowledge itY0
An in-house appellate clinic consists of unceasing opportunities to
explore the professional role of lawyering and analyze the relationship
88. In less than two weeks, we received a per curiam affirmance. State v. Gibson, No. 93-
2073 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 1994) (unpublished decision on file with The American
University Law Review).
89. The National Clinical Law Teachers Conference was held at the University of Minnesota
Law School on June 20, 1982.
90. Michael Meltsner, Feeling Like a Lawyer, 38J. LEGAL EDUc. 624, 624-25 (1983).
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between the self and work. Because the actual questioning or
considering of such issues is indeed incorporated into the syllabus, the
clinic maximizes the impact of such opportunities.
What occurs in this educational context of dealing with clients,
opposing counsel, and the courts is not just the students' constant
clarification of values that inform their professional decisions, but
their reckoning with an awareness that the professional identity
ensues-not just from a code-but from their sense of themselves as
human beings.9
1
In the story of candor, the decision that the students ultimately
made sprung from a consensus about the way the students wished to
conduct their lives. This, in essence, fueled their incentive to make
an act of candor conspire with-not against-zealous advocacy. In
the story of the sandbag, a seemingly minuscule event, which to the
students magnified itself into a monstrous betrayal, led to an insight
into what certain choices can harvest. Part of that realization was a
sentiment that the most insidiously toxic aftermath of certain
decisions does not take the form of a bad result in a case or the sting
of disciplinary proceedings or some olympian lightning bolt striking
us down, but rather issues forth as a subtle yet solemn sentence to
simply keep marching through life as oneself.
In an in-house appellate clinic, what we denominate "professional
responsibility" lessons become inseparable from the lessons in
appellate practice and procedure. That is, the "forces that will [and
do] confront, challenge, and tend to seduce the person as a law-
yer,"" erupt while reading the appellate rules, reviewing the record,
writing the briefs, doing the oral argument and while communicating
with clients, opposing counsel, and each other. Such a clinic is one
of the few contexts in which variegated goals become a complete
amalgam.
In describing how "clinical education can enhance the relationship
between legal theory and legal practice," Professor Phyllis Goldfarb
says that "[i]n the hands of clinical educators, experience can
generate theory which can circle back to inform experience, which in
turn can alter, refine, and improve the theory."93 What Goldfarb
attributes to clinical legal education is especially true of in-house
91. For discussions of how law school models of lawyering roles can conflict with the
students' human needs or impulses, see Grampton, supra note 64, at 259-60 (discussing moral
emptiness many law students feel and how law schools provide little help in resolving this
problem).
92. Barnhizer, supra note 62, at 1035.
93. Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers, supra note 5, at 721.
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appellate clinics. That is, they "contain[] an implicit epistemological
theory, and [their] .. .theory is inseparable from [their] practice."94
The dovetailing of theory and experience is intensified partly because
of the nature of appellate practice and its amenability to becoming a
theoretical doing and doingness theory.
Also, an in-house appellate clinic can perform the marriage rite
between the apprentice and Dean Langdell." The Langdellian
emphasis on the study of cases is, of course, integral to appellate
argument. Appellate advocacy does not, however, merely entail the
use of precedent, but also implicates and is, in fact, prompted by an
understanding of the appellate process as the potential making of
precedent. As such, any benefits that the Langdellian approach has
already bestowed on the law student blooms in such a clinic when
Langdellian methods unite with that student's appellate "apprentice-
ship."
In concluding where I began-with an allusion to Walter Pater's
theory about art-I suggest that "all legal education constantly aspires
toward the condition of an in-house appellate clinic."" The clinical
context does obliterate the putative distinction between the lesson
and the experience. The experience, in fact, penetrates every part of
the lesson. Such a clinic can be, like music, "ideally consummate.""
94. Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers, supra note 5, at 721.
95. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (discussing Langdellian case law method
and its drawbacks).
96. See PATER, supra note 1, at 156 (proclaiming that "[a]U art constantly aspires toward the
condition of music").
97. PATER, supra note 1, at 156.

